Automated Cloud-to-Cloud Migration of Distributed Software Systems for Privacy Compliance by Weimann, Philipp
X   =1.00
X   =0.01
perf
lossSD
Software Design and Quality
Automated Cloud-to-Cloud Migration




at the Department of Informatics
Institute for Program Structures and Data Organization (IPD)
Reviewer: Prof. Dr. Ralf H. Reussner
Second reviewer: Jun.-Prof. Dr.-Ing. Anne Koziolek
Advisor: Dr. rer. nat. Robert Heinrich
Second advisor: Dipl.-Inform. Kiana Rostami
01. March 2017 – 07. July 2017




I declare that I have developed and written the enclosed thesis completely by myself, and
have not used sources or means without declaration in the text.
Karlsruhe, 07.07.2017




With the steadily increasing number of (distributed) cloud systems and more strict data
protection regulations, an increasing interest in privacy law compliant cloud applications
arises. Many distributed cloud systems are operated without knowing whether the system
is compliant the law. When in 2018 the new EU Data Protective Regulations come into
force, severe punishments are possible if law violations are detected. A major factor
to privacy compliance is the distribution of personal data among the geo-location. We
developed, formalized, implemented and evaluated a privacy analyser to ensure privacy
law compliance. Further, we extend iObserve after the MAPE feedback loop for automated
privacy violation detection, alternative deployment generation and an according cloud
system adaptation. This way we can provide continuous privacy compliance on a soft-
ware architecture level, without code analysis. However, we require the closed world
assumption for privacy compliance. PerOpteryx is used for the generation of an alternative,
privacy compliant system deployment. Based on this alternative we compute a series
of adaptation steps to re-establish privacy compliance. On error occurrence, we make
use of the operator-in-the-loop approach of iObserve to help with the system evolution.
iObserve and PerOpteryx use the Palladio Component model as Architecture Description
Language. In this thesis, we are describing our concepts, point out implementation details
and evaluate the iObserve extension. The accuracy evaluation shows our system works as




Mit der ständig wachsenden Zahl von verteilten Cloudanwendungen und immer mehr
Datenschutzverordnungen wächst das Interesse an legalen Cloudanwendungen. Jedoch
ist vielen Betreibern der Legalitätsstatus ihrer Anwendung nicht bekannt. In 2018 wird
die neue EU Datenschutzverordnung in Kraft treten. Diese Verordnung beinhaltet emp-
ndliche Strafen für Datenschutzverletzungen. Einer der wichtigsten Faktoren für die
Einhaltung der Datenschutzverordnung ist die Verarbeitung von Stammdaten von EU-
Bürgern innerhalb der EU. Wir haben für diese Regelung eine Privacy Analyse entwickelt,
formalisiert, implementiert und evaluiert. Außerdem haben wir mit iObserve Privacy ein
System nach dem MAPE Prinzip entwickelt, dass automatisch Datenschutzverletzungen
erkennt und eine alternatives, datenschutzkonformes Systemhosting errechnet. Zudem
migriert iObserve Privacy die Cloudanwendung entsprechend dem alternativen Hosting
automatisch. Wir eine rechtskonforme Verteilung der Cloudanwendung gewährleisten,
ohne das System in seiner tiefe zu analysieren oder zu verstehen. Jedoch benötigen wir die
Closed World Assumption. Wir benutzen PerOpteryx für die Generierung von rechtskon-
formen, alternativen Hostings. Basierend auf diesem Hosting errechnen wir eine Sequenz
von Adaptionsschritten zur Wiedererlangung der Rechtskonformität. Wenn Fehler auf-
treten nutzen wir das Operator-in-the-loop Prinzip von iObserve. Als Datengrundlage
nutzen wir das Palladio Component Model. Diese Thesis beschreiben wir detailliert die
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During the introduction we will motivate (Section 1.1) for the topic at hand and introduce
the problems (Section 1.2) arising from it. Further, we will introduce the goal and research
questions (Section 1.3) handled in this thesis. Finally, we will give a short outline (Section 1.4)
about the remainder of this thesis.
1.1 Motivation
Over the last years, cloud computing has become more and more popular. This is a result
of its business advantages, the continuing simplication of its usage and the abundance of
own data centres. Netix, for example, closed all its owned data centre in 2015 and moved
completely to Amazons AWS[6]. This trend results in the expected revenue of about 200
Billion $ in 2016[26]. The high degree of elasticity, automation, self-service, exibility in
payment and, as a result, lower costs are only some of the many advantageous points of
cloud computing.[3]
However, many – especially European - companies fear dependencies, loss of data
control, industrial espionage or privacy law violations. Precautionary measures like
encryption or data splitting - among data centres - is not enough to prevent a public
relations disaster, due to complex EU Data Protective Regulations[4] or the US HIPAA
act[19]. To tell the whole truth, the complexity, the hidden usage of services and the
therefore resulting unawareness of many EU citizens (and law enforcement institutes)
makes it very unlikely for current law violators to face any consequences. Nevertheless,
citizens start to be more aware and the law enforcement point of attention tends to change
quickly, like the Max Schrems’ "Facebook Process" showed [14]. Further, in 2018 the
"reform of EU data protection rules" will come into force, which states severe punishments
for privacy violations[4]. As a result, entrepreneurs, companies and institutions need to
be more aware of privacy compliance to prevent major monetary and reputation losses.
The EU General Data Protection Regulations sets the legal boundaries for European
companies. It denes multiple regulations about data handling, data trading, personal
advertising and more. One rule sets the boundaries for personal data processing and
saving. It states, for example, that the processing of personal data is only allowed in data
centres inside the EU or certain certied countries with equivalent privacy laws. As a
result, software systems require a pre-deployment law compliance checking, considering
especially the hosts geo-locations. The problem comes to a head with the ease of migration
of whole cloud services during runtime with next to no downtime. With this in mind
a potential privacy violation could occur even though the initial deployment was law
compliant. This requires a non-stop observation of the applications geo-location and




To create such a privacy aware system adaptor, a couple of non-trivial problems need to
be solved. The major ones will be outlined shortly, categorized after the MAPE-K feedback
loop [5].
Initially, we need to acquire the geo-location information of a cloud server. This is the
fundamental task to be able to determine whether a system is compliant to the EU General
Data Protection Regulations or the HIPAA act. Further, we need to store this information
adequately in the available information sources. In our case that is the Palladio Component
Model (PCM), an architecture description language. However, the PCM is not designed to
store geo-information of any kind.
After the acquisition of the geo-location information, we need to determine, whether the
observed system is in a privacy compliant state. We refer to this task as privacy analysis.
The major obstacles for the privacy analysis are the limited information about the system
and the complicated legal regulations. So, the problem is to gain a meaningful result,
without signicantly extending the information sources or increasing the PCM complexity.
During the planning phase, a privacy compliant alternative system deployment needs
to be calculated. While automated performance optimization was achieved in the past,
the privacy compliance has never been considered during this task. Depending on the
parameters, alternative generation and evaluators this is a considerable optimization
problem.
To regain a privacy compliant system state, the system needs to be modied towards
the generated alternative. For this task, the system adaptation steps need to be calculated
and ordered. The migration of a live system usually inicts man dependencies and ripple
eects that have to be considered before executing these steps.
We provided a rough overview of the problems at hand. Further details and the according
solution will be explained in the according chapters of this thesis.
1.3 Goals and Research Questions
This thesis’ goal is to contribute and outline a piece of software, that ensures continues
privacy compliance, modelled after the MAPE-K feedback loop. Connected to this goal, a
number of important research questions arise:
• Monitoring
– RQ-M1: How can the required information be monitored and transformed
into the architectural description language?
– RQ-M2: How accurate is the monitoring and transformation?
– RQ-M3: How good does the monitoring and transformation scale?
• Analysing
– RQ-A1: How can we detect privacy violations on a architectural level?
– RQ-A2: Are there scenarios that can not be detect?
2
1.4 Outline
– RQ-A3: How good does the privacy analysis scale with the system size?
• Planning
– RQ-P1: How can we generate an alternative, privacy compliant deployment?
– RQ-P2: How accurate is the alternative generation?
• Executing
– RQ-E1: How can we calculate an automated system adaptation sequence?
– RQ-E2: How good does the adaptation calculation work?
– RQ-E3: How good does the adaptation scale with the system size and the
potential modications?
1.4 Outline
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows: The thesis continues by introducing
the foundations (chapter 2) of this thesis. The main part starts with the privacy concept
(chapter 3), leading into the system overview (chapter 4), followed by the big conceptual
work packages: Palladio extension (chapter 5), iObserve extension (chapter 6), privacy
analysis (chapter 7), PerOpteryx extension (chapter 8) and the system adaptation (chapter 9).
The thesis goes on with the evaluation (chapter 10) and the related work (chapter 11) and




In this chapter we will introduce applications and principles on which this thesis is based
on. This introduction aims for a general understanding. We would like to point out that
some topics may be discussed in more detail in the corresponding section.
2.1 MAPE-K loop
MAPE-K or MAPE was rst introduced by IBM for automatic computing and later discussed
in the context of self-adaptive systems. A MAPE system is usually a stand alone application,
which is specially build for optimizing and adapting a monitored system. MAPE-K is an
acronym, consisting of the rst letters of the loops stages: Monitor, Analyse, Plan, Execute
and Knowledgebase. These stages are sequentially ordered in a pipeline structure, each
one has a well dened task [5]:
• Monitor: Collects, aggregates, lters and correlates information about a monitored
system.
• Analyse: Performs (complex) data analysis and reasoning on the monitored data.
The analysis is often supported by data from the knowledgebase. If changes are
required, a change request is passed to the plan function.
• Plan: Determines what kind of changes are required and develops a transformation
which adapts the monitored system towards the desired state.
• Execute: Executes the transformation calculated during the planning phase.
• Knowledgebase: Additional or advanced information that are shared among all
stages.
The monitored system runs independently from the MAPE application. However, the
desired monitoring information are usually explicitly provided via specially designed APIs,
intefaces or probes [5].
2.2 Palladio Component Model
The Palladio Component Model (short PCM) is an Architecture Description Language
(ADL) for component based software, originally designed to enable software architects
to run pre-implementation performance analysis. The Palladio Simulator reports on
"performance bottlenecks, scalability issues, reliability threats, and allows for a subsequent
optimisation." The PCM is composed of several sub-models which depend on another.
Each model represents a certain aspect of a component based software:
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• Repository Model: Denes Components with required and provided interfaces.
Interfaces include function signatures.
• System Model: Denes the complete software system, by connecting components
dened in the repository model.
• Usage Model: Denes process workload, based on the systems interfaces.
• Resource Environment Model: Denes available host environments with its
provided performance.
• Allocation Model: Denes the deployment of system components onto the pro-
vided hosts.
The separation of concern enables the system architect to manage the complexity of
even bigger software systems and still gain meaningful results from the performance
simulation.
Since its initial release, the Palladio Component Model was adapted and used in several
research elds alongside the performance prediction, like automated Dataow Analysis
and Application Monitoring. Due to its explicit representation of the software architecture
and exible component-host-mapping it is perfectly suited to model distributed cloud
systems. Although, PCM was not designed to be used as a runtime model, it has proven to
be suited for this task due to its versatile model elements [2].
2.3 Kieker
Kieker is a software system monitoring application with the goal of retrieving runtime
information for performance evaluation, (self-)adaptation control and many other tasks.
Kieker gains these information from the designated software by instrumenting the system
with probes during pre-compilation. Each probe has designated purpose and gathers data
accordingly, for example hardware utilization, stack trace or host geo-location. Kieker
uses event-based probes, as well as periodic-based (heart-beat) probes [22].
2.4 iObserve
iObserve is a system optimization tool after the MAPE feedback loop. The two primary
goals are an automated system adaptation and an operator-in-the-loop system evolution
(see Figure 2.1).
For the initial MAPE step, monitoring, iObserve uses Kieker. The gathered information
are transformed to a Palladio Component Model. Due to the live characteristic this PCM
model is called a runtime model. Further, iObserve is designed to support distributed cloud
systems. Key features of the transformation are the processing stack trace information
for usage model updates, so more precise performance simulations are possible, as well




Figure 2.1: iObserve cloud application life cycle [10]
Currently, iObserve goes as far as updating the model. iObserve uses the TeeTime
framework [30], a pipeline-lter-framework with signal based stage invocation. More
details on iObserve can be found in [10][11].
2.5 PerOpertyx
"PerOpteryx is an optimization framework to improve component-based software architec-
ture"[17]. The optimization uses model-based quality prediction techniques. Starting from
an input model, the framework generates multiple Pareto-optimal alternative deployments,
based on given simulation and alternation algorithms. This approach is usually described
as Design Space Exploration (DSE). PerOpteryx uses multiple dimensions for its DSE, like
alternating component multiplicities, runtime parameters or changing component alloca-
tions. The Pareto-optimal models are calculated through multiple iterations of a series of
tasks. Initially a variance of candidates is created through an evolutionary algorithm and
random generation. In the next step, the candidates are analysed for the desired quality
marks along the dierent dimensions. The iteration concludes with the elimination of
poorly performing candidates. PerOpteryx is designed to optimize Palladio Component




Many say: Data is the new oil and the most valuable resource there is. This shows how
important the control of our personal data is. To achieve this, many players have to
fulll their obligations. On the one hand, the personal awareness of every user himself to
only communicate the required and necessary information. On the other hand, the data
handling institutes duty to guarantee legal compliance to laws like the EU’s general data
protective regulations. While one can’t act for the individual, we can provide tools and
rules for institutions to help with legal compliance.
3.1 General Concept
The EU General Data Protective Regulations clearly states, that data of EU citizens have to
be saved and processed within EU countries [4]. Only a view countries with equal data
protective laws are excepted from this constraint. As a consequence, one needs a simple
data-ow analysis (Section 11.3) to know the data distribution in our software system. To
put it straight, one needs to know, what kind of data are available on which server. This
task got especially important, since distributed cloud systems are reality and data saved
on "on premise" servers are becoming increasingly rare.
As mentioned in Section 11.3, the automated data-ow analysis on architecture level is
still in its early stages and therefore not suited for practice. As a compromise we decided
on manual data tagging. To ease the data tagging and analysis process, we decided to use
the common well dened categories [24]:
• Type 0: Personal Information: Data relates directly or indirectly to personal
information. This is independent from encryption or pseudonymization. (e.g. call
detail record)
• Type 1: Personally Identiable Information: Data does not contain personal
information. However, by combining, fusing or analysing data sets, the personal data
could be reconstructed for complete or partial personal information. (e.g. browser
history without user)
• Type 2: Anonymous Data: Data does not contain any personal information. Even
by extensive data analysis no direct or indirect personal information can be extracted.
(e.g. shop inventory data)
These three categories are used, since many data do not contain any direct or indirect
link onto private data, however still contain indicators onto private data. This means, they
neither qualify for the type 0 category (Personal), nor for the type 2 category (Anonymous).
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For example an online shop wants to analyse which products usually get ordered together.
The orders got anonymized by removing the customer and shipping address. Nevertheless,
the time-stamp is required to get a timed evaluation factor. These data are not personal.
However, combining and evaluating these with user-login-times, also non-personal data,
privacy relevant data can be extracted. This also disqualies them for Type 2, completely
anonymous data [23][24].
Summarizing, a manual, categorized annotation approach to identify the system com-
ponents privacy level is used. Based on this privacy level categorization, the analysis,
whether a systems deployment is privacy compliant, can be performed.
3.2 Deployment Constraints
How can one guarantee legal compliant distribution? As mentioned in Section 1.1, personal
data of EU citizens are only allowed to be processed, transferred or saved inside EU
countries [...]. We argue that the following constraints, combined with correct manual
annotation, are sucient to accomplish this:
• Rule #1: Type 0 components must be deployed in a "save" geo-location.
• Rule #2: Type 2 components can be deployed anywhere.
• Rule #3: Type 1 components can be deployed anywhere.
• Rule #4: Only deploy Type 1 components together in an "un-save" geo-location, if
they receive their information (transitively) from the same Type 1 component.
Rule 1 & 2 does not need any further explanation. Rule 3 states that Type 1 components
can be deployed anywhere. This is due to the fact that Type 1 data should not contain any
personal information. Rule 4 however limits this deployment. This constraint is necessary,
because the combination of multiple Type 1 data streams could lead to privacy relevant
information. If the data streams, however, have a common type 1 component as data
source, the deployment can be considered privacy compliant.
The ideas is, when a depersonalised component (d) has a single edge to a personal com-
ponent (p), and many edges to other depersonalised components (D), and the components
(D) do not have any connection a personal categorized component, then they share the
data passed via the connection between d and p, which can not be personal. Otherwise d
would be categorized as personal. Note that data streams with type 2 components can be
ignored, since - by denition - they don’t get in contact with any privacy relevant data.
We are aware, that these rules are over-approximations towards legal compliance.
However, we are using a software architecture model as the only source of information.
Therefore, detailed information about actual privacy symbiotic data streams are not avail-
able on this high level ob abstraction. Nevertheless, we argue, that these rules already
help to identify illegal deployments and establish privacy compliant (re-)deployments.
Figure 3.1, Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3 illustrate the dierent base scenarios applying to
Rule 4. In the remainder of this section, we will elaborate their privacy compliance state

















Figure 3.1: Privacy violating deployment
The deployment shown in Figure 3.1 is illegal. Server#3 contains components with
data streams from two dierent components, where one is a type 1 and one is a type 0
component. Even though A and C receives its data transitively from the same source,
component A. This source is categorized as personal (type 0). Further, the data passes via
dierent initial communication edges. As a result, Server #3 hosts two type 1 components,
which don’t contain privacy relevant data by themselves. However, after combination, the















Figure 3.2: Privacy violating deployment
Figure 3.2 also shows an illegal considered deployment. Component C and D share the
same data source, which is marked as type 0. As previously shown, the combination of















Figure 3.3: Privacy compliant deployment
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(Figure 3.3) shows a privacy compliant deployment. Due to, Component C and D sharing
the same data source (Component B), which already only contains type 1 data. As a result,
Component C and D can only contain data, already obtained by Component B. This
means, even through data combination and extensive data analysis, no privacy concerning
information can be extracted.
3.3 Component categorization
Components can be very complex due to multiple communication partners and dozens
of interfaces. In such cases it can be considered impossible, to keep track of every sin-
gle information ow on every component. This shows, that a component shouldn’t be
categorized by hand.
In contrast, a single data stream between two components is easy to understand and
easy to analyse. In a component based software architecture, data exchange happens via
component interfaces. During system composition the software architect must be aware
of what data he passes through an interfaces.
As a result, the decision was made to categorize each interface communication during
system composition. The components privacy categorization is then derived by evaluating
the components communication.
We need to point out, that this categorization is only valid with the Closed World
Assumption (CWA) [20]. Simplied, the CWA states, that if a system doesn’t contain any
information about a given statement, this statement is automatically wrong. Applied onto
the privacy concept this means: The model contains all the information and information
sources that exist. Naturally, this assumption is wrong, since every component may be
connected to the internet and can access a nearly innite amount of data. However, we need
the CWA, in order to be able to make any statement about the systems privacy compliance.
Considering the limited information we have available, the system architecture model, the
statement we are providing can be considered outstanding, even while using the CWA.
3.4 Information storage
We are using the Palladio Component Model (Section 2.2), which is just one of several
Architecture Description Languages. Most ADLs share a comparable structure, which can
dier, due to the designated purpose. We will describe the storage exemplarily on the
PCM.
The runtime model is supposed to reect every relevant information, concerning the
models purpose. As a result, we need to store the components privacy level and the servers
geo-location in the PCM model.
The geo-location belongs to a server, which is part of the resource environment model in
PCM. The resource environment contains resource containers, which represents a server




As mentioned in Section 3.3, we need to categorize the communication between two
connected component interfaces. The PCM system model uses the Assembly Connector
to connect two component interfaces. This is the optimal model element to store the data




In this chapter we will give an overview on the approach developed during this thesis
and the according research. The system is massively extending iObserve, while keeping
its original purpose. For the fundamentals on iObserve see Section 2.4. All extensions
are made for accomplishing the goals, dened in Section 1.3. The extended iObserve is
referred to as iObserve Privacy during this thesis. iObserve Privacys architecture is a lter

















Figure 4.1: iObserve Privacy pipeline
The initial step, monitoring, is provided by the original iObserve. However, iObserve
does not support geo-location processing. So, iObserve needs to be extended. This ex-
tension is made directly in the original iObserve and Kieker. Upon detected geo-location
or deployment changes, the runtime model is updated and the next lter stage is in-
voked. We have determined the required data for a privacy analysis and provide a suited
transformation of these information to the PCM Privacy runtime model.
The compliance checker, mostly referenced as Privacy Analysis, represents the analysis
phase in the MAPE loop. It analyses the current runtime model for privacy violations. The
fundamental principles were discussed in chapter 3. When a privacy violation is detected,
the MAPE Planning phase gets activated.
The planning stages task is to nd a privacy compliant redeployment model. For this
job PerOpteryx is used. PerOpteryx (Section 2.5) is a complex model generation and
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optimization framework. However, PerOpteryx doesn’t support privacy or deployment
constraints and therefore needs an extension. Furthermore, an output model needs to be
selected as the nal redeployment candidate, which is transmitted to the nal pipeline
lter stage.
The execute phase of the MAPE loop compares the architectural re-deployment model to
the architectural runtime model. Based on comparison, a migration adaptation sequence is
calculated. The adaptation sequence is technology independent and consists of individual
adaptation actions. Finally, the adaptation sequence is executed. The execution is based on
scripts, that represent a technology dependent implementation of the individual adaptation




As mentioned in Section 2.2, the Palladio Component Model was designed for early
architectural performance analysis. On this basis, the PCM was modied many times to
full many adjacent tasks. Instead of a modication, we decided to extend the existing
PCM meta-model. This enables us to keep compatible with the existing Palladio Models
and other Palladio applications.
5.1 General
The standard Palladio meta-model is insucient for privacy compliance analysis. To save
the required information, an extension is the best practice approach. The extension was
designed to be as minimal invasive as possible and to keep the adaptation eort for existing
Palladio models to a minimum.
Our extension is based on deriving the PCM meta-model entities. This way the new
models stay compatible to other PCM applications like the Performance Simulators or
PerOpteryx. Further, other extension possibilities like the steriotype extension needs to be
updated with every PCM meta-model update. This is not necessary, when the model is
derived. Only changes in reference structure require the derived model to apply minor
alterations. For details on referencing and modularizing in meta-models see [28].
The concept was described in Section 3.4.
5.2 Implementation
The Palladio meta-model was modelled with the Eclipse Modeling Framework [EMF]. So,
our extension, namely PCM Privacy, is also modelled with EMF and references the original
Palladio meta-model. The required classes were extended in corresponding sub-packages.
As described in Section 3.4, we need to save a servers geo-location. The Resource
Container was extended and the attribute Geolocation added. The derived element is
named Resource Container Privacy. The geo-location itself is saved as an EInt Ecore type, a
standard integer, encoded in the ISO country code (ISO 3166-1 [32]). By using an integer
encoded international standard we stay wildly compatible with other applications. Further,
potential error sources like spelling dierences, shifting borders and name changes are
avoided.
The Assembly Connector Privacy is derived from the Assembly Connector and saves
the data privacy categorization. The attribute is designed as an EEnum Ecore type, with
the values Personal, Depersonalized, Anonymized. This way, extending the potential


















Figure 5.1: PCM Privacy meta-model
categorization via a oat or an integer value. The value Personal is set as default, to provide
a over-estimation towards the legally compliant categorization, when the categorization if
a connector was not performed. Figure 5.1 shows a simplied PCM meta-model with the
three added privacy elements.
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iObserve was briey introduced in Section 2.4. iObserve uses Kieker (Section 2.3) to
gain real-time information about an observed (distributed) software system. iObserve
transforms these information onto a Palladio Component Model. This model is referenced
as runtime PCM or runtime model, since it reects the actual observed software system
during runtime [11].
6.1 Kieker
Kieker was also briey introduced in Section 2.3. Kieker had already specied the geo-
location record for transporting the geo-location information form the observed system to
Kieker. However, a probe was still missing. As a result, we created a heart-beat/periodic
probe (ServerGeoLocationSampler). This probe uses a ICountryInvestigator to determine
the actual geo-location and creates a ServerGeoLocation record (see Figure 6.1).
As an alternative, we could have created an event-based geo-location probe. Possible
event could have been the component deployment or un-deployment or the server acqui-
sition or release. This however, would mean, there would not be a geo-location update
between these events and potential privacy violation could stay undetected indenitely
or for a long period. Even though a heart-beat probe often takes longer to send an initial






















Figure 6.1: Server Geo-Location Record and Sampler
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Kieker gather the information from the observed system probes and redirects them to
iObserve. More information on Kieker can be found at [22].
6.2 iObserve Privacy
iObserve uses the TeeTime framework. Its allows easy pipeline building by connecting
matching input and output ports during runtime [30]. This mechanism is used by iObserve
to invoke dierent transformations. Based on the received Monitoring Record, the according
output port gets invoked and the matching transformation will be executed.
For the ServerGeoLocation Record (see Figure 6.1) another output port and transformation
was added. The transformation uses the records host and address eld to nd the record
sending resource container. The according geo-location attribute of the Resource Container
















Figure 6.2: iObserve Privacy Filter
iObserve has a well dened structure due to the TeeTime framework. We decided to
keep this structure and extend it. Figure 4.1 shows the conceptual lter pipeline structure
for our planned extension. One conceptual stage usually consists of several sub tasks.
The system adaptation, for example, consists of an adaptation calculation, an adaptation
planning and an execution. To embrace re-usability and lose coupling, we decided to
keep on using the TeeTime framework structure and compose one conceptual stage out
of several sub-stages. Figure 6.2 shows the general structure of a conceptual stage. The
Composistion Stage functions as a wrapper for the conceptual lter, while the Stages I to
III represent the sub-tasks.
This structure does not only allow easy restructuring of the conceptual pipeline and
encapsulates the sub-tasks, it also allows for simple reuse and a clear separation of concerns.
For the TeeTime framework, the lter stages looks like a series of linear connected stages,
while the developer gets easy to handle packages. It is worth mentioning, that Stages
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linked to each other require matching data. The actual task executed, must be placed
inside the execute method.
The extended iObserve contains the following conceptual lter stages: Monitoring,
Snapshot (creates a copy of the current runtime model), Privacy Analysis, Model Generation,
System Adaptation and Evaluation. In the remainder of this thesis the extended iObserve




The Privacy Analysis represents the analysis stage in the MAPE-K feedback loop (Sec-
tion 2.1). The goal is to check whether the runtime model contains any deployment related
privacy violations. The privacy concept, described in chapter 3, states that privacy analysis
consist of two major tasks. First, the correct privacy categorization for each software
components needs to be determined. Second, the deployment evaluation, based on the
deployment rules, dened in Section 3.2, needs to be performed.
The remaining chapter is divided into a theoretical part (Section 7.1), a component
categorization part (Section 7.2), a deployment evaluation part (Section 7.3) and the imple-
mentation part (Section 7.4).
7.1 Analysis Theory
The exclusive source of information for the privacy analysis is the systems PCM Privacy
runtime model. For an ecient analysis one rst need to identify the minimal required
information and substitute them, depending on the available sources.
7.1.1 Required information
In the context of Privacy Analysis there is a minimum of two pieces of information which
are required for privacy analysis:
# Required information for privacy analysis
M1 Information on components privacy level
M2 Information on components geo-location
Table 7.1: Minimal information for privacy analysis
Usually M1 and M2 is not directly available. As a consequence other ones must substitute
these, while containing the same information. A suitable substitution, diers based on the
sources and their contained information.
The used PCM Privacy meta-model provides a data privacy categorization of the com-
municated information between component interfaces. This enables a component classi-
cation, based on the most critical communication with another component. As a result, a
components privacy level can be determined without knowing its exact purpose, analysing
any inner processes or knowing the exact data-ow. So, M1 gets substituted by information
about inter interface communication and its privacy categorization.
In order to get an information equivalent of M2, a components host must be determined,
as well as that hosts geo-location. The PCM Privacy model provides these information.
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However, it is spread over multiple models. As a result we require only four pieces of
information (Table 7.2), compared to R-PRISs six pieces of information (Table 11.1).
# Required information to carry out runtime check
I1 Interactions of two components per interface
I2 Information on component deployments on physical resources
I3 Geo-location information of physical resources
I4 Data Privacy categorization per interface communication
Table 7.2: iObserves information for runtime privacy checks
7.1.2 Data-flow direction
Usually component interfaces are categorized into providing and requiring interfaces.
Interface connections are made between a pair of required and provided interfaces of
the same type. This suggests a certain data- and control-ow direction. This is a wrong
assumption. While there are cases, when the control-ow can be derived from this structure,
the data-ow is completely independent from this categorization.
For example, a database component (usually) only has provided interfaces. These
interfaces allows the user to store and retrieve data from the database and therefore
contains getter and setter methods. This means, there is no data-ow direction for the
whole interfaces, since the data needs to "ow" into both directions. Note, that we are
explicitly speaking of an interface as a whole, since individual methods can have a data-ow
direction.
Information passed through an interface are available on the providing and requiring
component. In other terms, if an component connector got categorized as Personal, in-
formation of this type are available in both components. These components need to get
categorized accordingly.
7.1.3 Joining data streams
In Section 3.2 we elaborated on the danger of two Personally Identiable Information
(Type 1) data streams, from two sources, joining on a single server. In such a case, the
combination of these data streams could lead to personal, privacy relevant data. (Compare
Section 3.2, Rule 4). This concept applies on the described deployment level and also on
the component categorization process.
While on deployment level, the information streams are not actively merged, this is a
realistic possibility on the component categorization level. So the argument of applying an
overestimation is not valid and this scenario must be taken seriously. In the following this
special case will be refereed to as joining data streams (short: JDS). In the following section,




The component categorization requires two tasks. The initial categorization of every
component and the analysis for with join data streams.
The initial data privacy level of a component is equal the components most critical
communication level (see Subsection 7.1.2). This task is performed during the model
graph construction. The search for joining data streams is more complex and requires
a formalization, as well as an extended explanation. We will continue with the formal
description, followed by an textual explanation and close with some examples.
Denitions
• The Graph G := (N ,E)
• The Nodes N consist of personal Nodes p ∈ Np , depersonalised Nodes d ∈ Nd
and anonymized Nodes a ∈ Na ∧ Np ∪ Nd ∪ Na = N ∧ Np ∩ Nd ∩ Na = {∅}
• The edges E consist of personal Edges ep ∈ Ep , depersonalised Edges ed ∈ Ed
and anonymized Edges ea ∈ Ea ∧ Ep ∪ Ed ∪ Ea = E ∧ Ep ∩ Ed ∩ Ea = {∅}
• Path P = 〈(p1,p2, . . . ,pn), (e1, e2, . . . , en−1)〉 with p ∈ N and e ∈ E
Formalization
Every component is correctly categorized
⇔
 Path P with let i, j ∈ [0,n − 1] ∧ i , j : ei , ej ∧ ei ∈ Ed
∧(p2,p3, . . . ,pn−1) ∈ Nd ∧ {p1,pn} ∈ Np ∧ n ≥ 3
The formalization states, that every component in the graph G is correctly categorized
if no path from one personal component to a personal component exist. However, the
path must traverse at least three components, while every edge is only used once and
only depersonalised edges are used. Further, all internal nodes must have a depersonalised
categorization.
When such a case is found, the depersonalised components of the path must be cat-
egorized as Personal. As a result, the case is eliminated and categorization is corrected
according to the joining data stream. The following examples will illustrate the categoriza-
tion and point out certain special cases.
Figure 7.1 shows the components data privacy level after the initial categorization phase.
Figure 7.2 shows the result of categorization analysis. The comparison of these two states
show, that component D and E get "upcasted" and gain a Personal - more critical - data
privacy categorization. This is due to the fact, that component D and E have a connection
onto two personal data sources (Component A and B). Applying the formalization, a path
from component A to B via component E and D, using only depersonalised edges, can be
found. This means, as mentioned above, a joining data stream exists and component D
and E needs to be categorized as Personal.
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Figure 7.1: Initial component categorization
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Figure 7.2: Post categorization analysis - basic example
Two special cases are shown in Figure 7.3. So is component D categorized as Personal
even though it has only one other component as data source. However, it has two individual
connections to component B, which could contain a joining data stream, since B has a
personal categorization. The formalization states, that a personal component needs to be
reached, while using every edge only once. This conditions are fullled.
Component A Component C
Component E
Component B








Figure 7.3: Post categorization analysis - advanced example
Component F doesn’t get an Personal categorization since it can only contain privacy
relevant data that are already present on component E. And component E has a depersonal-
ized categorization. All anonymized categorized connections and components are ignored,
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since they don’t contain any privacy related information. Applying the formalization, no
path from A to a personal component can be found, using only depersonalised edges and
each edge only once. So, the categorization is correct.
7.3 Deployment analysis
The deployment analysis’ goal is to nd out whether the current deployment is privacy
compliant. A deployment is considered privacy compliant if no deployment violation is
found. The rules for a privacy compliant deployment were described in Section 3.2. In the
following we will formalize the deployment analysis, describe the formalization textually
and nally give an example.
Denitions
• The Graph G := (N ,E, S)
• The Nodes N consist of personal Nodes p ∈ Np , depersonalised Nodes d ∈ Nd
and anonymized Nodes a ∈ Na ∧ Np ∪ Nd ∪ Na = N ∧ Np ∩ Nd ∩ Na = {∅}
• The edges E consist of personal Edges ep ∈ Ep , depersonalised Edges ed ∈ Ed
and anonymized Edges ea ∈ Ea ∧ Ep ∪ Ed ∪ Ea = E ∧ Ep ∩ Ed ∩ Ea = {∅}
• The servers S consist of save Servers ss ∈ Ss and un-save Servers su ∈ Su ∧
Ss ∪ Su = S ∧ Su ∩ Ss ∩ Na = {∅}
• Let Nsi are the nodes deployed on server si
• Path P = 〈(p1,p2, . . . ,pn), (e1, e2, . . . , en−1)〉 with p ∈ N and e ∈ E
Formalization
The deployment is illegal
⇔
∃n ∈ Nsi : n ∈ Np ∧ n deployed on si ∧ si ∈ Su
∨
∃sx ∈ Su Path with Nsx ⊂ P ∧ pi ∈ Nd ∧ ej ∈ Ed
∨
∃ Paths {P1, P2, . . . , Pn} from Np to Nsi with i ∈ [0,n], j,k ∈ [0, |Pi |] :
ej ∈ Ed ∧ epj ∩ epk = {∅} ∧ n ≥ 2
The formalization states three independent conditions for an illegal deployment. First,
the deployment of an as personal categorized component on a server located in an un-
save geo-location. Second, the depersonalised components on a un-save server are not
connected. The potential connection must consist of depersonalised edges but can be
transitive via depersonalised components and edges. The third condition states, that if
there is more then one path, from the set of personal components to the depersonalised
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Figure 7.4: Deployment analysis example
components hosted by an un-save server, then the deployment is illegal. However, must
consist of individual, non overlapping and depersonalised edges.
Figure 7.4 shows an illegal deployment. The deployment of Component A and B is
obviously valid, due to its deployment on a "save" geo-location. Component C and F
are also legally deployed, since both components share a single communication edge
onto privacy relevant information and the joining data streams situation does not apply.
Applying the formalization, the rst condition is broken, since server #3 does not host a
personal component, the second condition is also false, since the components C and D
are transitive and direct connected via depersonalised edges. The third condition does
also not apply, since only one individual path via depersonalised edges from the personal
components exists.
Server#2, however, hosts an illegal deployment. Component D and E have dierent single
data sources edges and can therefore save, process or transmit data, which can combine
to privacy relevant data. The second and the third condition of the formal specication
are true. So, are component E and D not transitively connected via depersonalised nodes.
Further, two individual paths from the set of personal components to the components
hosted by server #2 exist.
7.4 Privacy Analysis implementation
The PCM meta-model denes multiple models, each providing knowledge about a certain
aspect of the target system (see Figure 7.5). This is not suited for an ecient privacy
analysis and therefore requires an information preprocessing. So the implementation is
spread over three steps:




7.4 Privacy Analysis implementation
7.4.1 Information preprocessing
In the rst algorithm phase, all informations I1 to I4 are extracted from the dierent
models. I1 and I4 is part of the System models Assembly Connector Privacy. Where I1
consist of the Providing Assembly Context and the Requiring Assembly Context. I4 is the
Data Privacy Level. I3 is a eld in the Resource Container, which represents a server in the
Resource Environment model. The Allocation model contains I2 in Allocation Contexts,
which provide a mapping of an Assembly Contexts on a Resource Containers.
After extracting all required information, the basic data privacy level for every compo-
nent/Assembly Context is calculated by applying the most critical privacy level from the
corresponding Assembly Connectors.
As last step of the preprocessing, the data are reassembled by constructing a sucient
graph (Figure 7.6). The graph is a simple, more direct representation of host-component-
allocation structure from the PCM model. The graph contains two types of nodes: the
DeploymentNode, a host representation, and the ComponentNode, a component represen-














Figure 7.5: PCM Privacy information spread
7.4.2 Component categorization implementation
The second phase of the privacy analysis algorithm nalizes the component categorization.
As described in Section 7.2, joining data streams need to be found and tting components’












-assemblyContextID : String -dataPrivacyLvl : DataPrivacyLvl
Figure 7.6: Graphs meta-model for Privacy Analysis
The algorithm (Algorithm 1) searches for depersonalised-marked connections from one
personal categorized component to another. It uses a deep search rst approach, while
never using an edge twice. Note, that once a joining data stream is found, the involved
components are appended to the list of personal components.
7.4.3 Deployment analysis implementation
The nal privacy analysis phase is the deployment evaluation. The base analysis is
very simple, since it simply checks whether every as personal categorized component is
deployed on an as save considered geo-location. The a geo-location is considered as save,
when it is contained in the save-geo-location list. When a server is located in an un-save
geo-location and contains more then one depersonalised component, an extensive analysis
for joining data streams has to be made. This extensive analysis is described in Algorithm
2.
The Algorithm works similar to Algorithm 1. Initially, it extracts all as depersonalised
categorized components on the server. These components have to form a transitive hull
and share a single depersonalised communication link to a single personal component.
The algorithm uses a deep search rst approach to traverse through the components. If a
second link to a personal component is found or not every depersonalised component on
the server is reached, the deployment is illegal.
Note, that anonymized categorized components and edges can be ignored during analysis.
Also, a server won’t contain any personal marked component since such a deployment
would be automatically illegal due to the servers un-save geo-location.
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Algorithm 1 Component categorization algorithm
1: List of Components components
2: Set of Edges usedEdдes
3:
4: procedure StartCategorization(List<Components> components)
5: personalComponents ← componentswithPrivacyLvl == PERSONAL
6: for all personalComponent ← Components do
7: clear( usedEdдes )




12: function TraverseComponent(Component component )
13: dePersonalEdдes ← component .GetEdges with PrivacyLvl == DEPERSONAL
14: for all edдe ← dePersonalEdдes do
15:
16: if usedEdдes .Contains( edдe ) then
17: Continue
18: else
19: usedEdдes .Add( edдe )
20: edдeParnter ← edдe .GetEdgePartner( component )
21:
22: if edдeParnter .PrivacyLvl == PERSONAL then
23: return edдeParnter
24: else
25: secondSource ← TraverseComponent( edдeParnter )
26: if secondSource , PERSONAL then
27: component .PrivacyLvl ← PERSONAL










Algorithm 2 Deployment analysis algorithm
1: Set of Components compToReach
2: Set of Edges usedEdдes
3: Edge dataSourceEdдe
4:
5: procedure ExtensiveAnalysis(Server server )
6: compToReach ← server .GetComponents with PrivacyLvl == DEPERSONAL
7: dataSourceEdдe ← Null
8: startComp ← compToReach.GetAny
9: clear usedEdдes
10: sinдlePersonalDataSource ←TraverseComponent(startComp)
11: return sinдlePersonalDataSource AND compToReach.IsEmpty
12: end procedure
13:
14: function TraverseComponent(Component component )
15: compToReach.Remove( component )
16: dePersonalEdдes ← component .GetEdges with PrivacyLvl == DEPERSONAL
17:
18: for all edдe ← dePersonalEdдes do
19: if usedEdдes .Contains( edдe ) then
20: Continue
21: else
22: usedEdдes .Add( edдe )
23: edдeParnter ← edдe .GetEdgePartner( component )
24:
25: if edдeParnter .PrivacyLvl == PERSONAL then
26: if dataSourceEdдe == Null then





32: sinдleDataSource ← TraverseComponent( edдeParnter )










PerOpteryx, briey introduced in Section 2.5, is a model optimization framework. It is
designed to calculate performance and cost optimised PCM models. For this purpose
PerOpetryx uses an evolutionary algorithm to generate new PCM candidates. PerOpteryx
uses a Design Decisions EMF model to create a Design Space. The design space is dened
via Degrees Of Freedom. Every degree of freedom allows for a nite amount of Decisions. A
Candidate consists of one choice per degree of freedom and represents a PCM instance.
Every candidate needs to be evaluated in order to decide if the Decisions made during
its constructions lead to a good results. Each evaluator can produce multiple results per
analysis run. Each result belongs to a certain QML dimension. A dimension has Objectives
and/or Constraints, which helps the evolutionary algorithm to nd the Pareto-optimal
candidates. Every evaluator is encapsulated in an Eclipse Plug-in [17]. Since we need
another evaluator, we need to create a new plug-in.
Some plug-ins require additional data. The cost analysis for example uses a cost model
to provide a cost result for the resource containers allocation and usage costs.
8.1 Plug-in Design
We want to provide a Privacy Analysis evaluator for PerOpteryx, while using our previously
developed Privacy Anylsis (chapter 7). Since both systems are based on the Palladio
Component Model, the privacy analysis itself can be used as described in chapter 7.
However, PerOpteryx does not know a "Privacy Dimension", which is required, since every
analysis result needs an according dimension. A new dimension is required, since using a
pre-existent dimension - like the "cost dimension" - would undermine the evolutionary
algorithms optimizations eort. The privacy analysis has a single result, which is a
Constraint. It states, that no privacy violation is permitted.
As mentioned before, we need to create a new QML Dimension, the Privacy Dimension,
which is referenced in a QML Contract Type. The contract type references all the evaluation
dimensions. The QML Declaration references the contract type and species the actual
objectives and constraints for the dimensions. Further, it species a QML Prole, which
Usage Model is used for the evaluation.
8.2 PerOpteryx Modification
PerOpteryx’ prior structure considers every generated candidate to be valid, only with
dierent runtime results. This is incorrect, when the privacy dimension is included. Only
privacy compliant models are valid options. As a result, we can abort the evaluation of the
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current PCM model, if the privacy constraint is broken. However, this means we need to
execute the privacy evaluation rst, check if the constraint is broken, break the evaluation
if the model is invalid and ll all other objectives and constraints with according values.
As mentioned above, every evaluation is encapsulated in an Eclipse Plug-in. So, every
evaluation is represented as Proxy Analysis in PerOpteryx, who has no information on
what evaluation he is actually currently executing. To save evaluation time and increase
our search space, we need to execute the Privacy Analysis rst, while not breaking the
generic evaluation characteristic. As a result, the IAnalysis interface for every evaluation
was extended with a Evaluation Complexity query, returning an Enum representing the
analysis runtime duration. PerOpteryx was modied in a way, that analysis returning the
value VERY_SHORT get executed rst. The Privacy Analysis evaluator returns this value.
Further, PerOpteryx was modied, to output the most cost ecient candidate once
all evaluation iterations are completely executed. The cost criteria was chosen over
performance due to PerOpteryx’s tendency to spread the allocation over many server to
optimize the performance. The cost optimal model tends to group components on servers,




In the system adaptation stage of iObserve Privacy the observed software system is
modied to match the re-deployment PCM. This ler stage represents part of the planning
and the complete execution phase of the MAPE loop (Section 2.1).
The remainder of this chapter is divided into the calculation of an adaptation plan
(Adaptation Planning, Section 9.1) and the execution of this adaptation plan (Adaptation
Execution, Section 9.2). It closes with a look onto the implementation (Section 9.3).
9.1 Adaptation Planning
The planning phases job is to calculate what actions are required to bring the observed
software system into the state dened by the re-deployment model. While the task is
pretty clear, the available source of informations are quite uncertain.
There are multiple potential sources of information that can be used to calculate adapta-
tion steps. For example, the Design Decisions le used and modied by PerOpteryx (see
chapter 8). This le contains all choices made during generation of the re-deployment
model. These informations are a viable source for the action computation. However, this
source create a strong dependency on PerOpteryx. This means, when PerOpteryx would
be exchanged for another model optimization tool, the complete adaptation planning
needs to be re-thought and developed.
Another information source for the adaptation planning could be the close observation
of the candidate calculation/generation. This could be achieved by logging decisions
made by the evolutionary algorithm. When considering that the starting point of an
evolutionary algorithms is usually a given input, the modication steps could be traced
and remodelled for the system adaptation. However, evolutionary algorithms usually
don’t take the shortest path onto their end result and also random mutations are an valid
generation factor. This means, the results needs to be analysed and optimized, while also
injecting observations probes. While being a good potential information source, the eort
for post-generation analysis and the resulting dependencies make it a bad choice.
We decided to make a direct comparison of the architectural runtime model and the
architectural re-deployment model. This builds up no further dependencies and the
shortest adaptation path can be found. However, the information preprocessing and the
comparison algorithm can be more complex than the other options. The comparison itself
is based around identier and content equality. The Adaptation Caluclation compares
the model graphs (see Subsection 7.4.1) whether a component was added, removed or
modied, as well as a server was acquired or released. Derived from these dierences,




Palladio models are independent from programming languages, technologies and other
specics. We decided to enforce this characteristic by dening technology independent
actions. They contain the required information, without knowing anything about the used
technologies.
Further, we designed a set of basic actions which allows us to (theoretically) transform
any PCM runtime instance into any PCM re-deployment instance. These are derived from
the runtime changes specied in [10] and the potential variation PerOpteryx calculates
during its optimization process. The actions can be grouped into two major disjunct
subgroups: the Assembly Context Actions and the Resource Container Actions.




– Change Repository Component Action




Assembly Context Actions reect all model changes around a software component. The
Allocate action represents a new or rst deployment of a system component, the Deallocate
action represents the exact opposite, the deleting or un-deployment of a component. And
Migration action moves a component from a server to another. The Change Repository
Component action addresses the possibility to exchange a software component with an
equivalent one. This can happen due to better tting performance characteristics, while
required and provided interfaces stay the same. As a result, the structure of the system
model stays unchanged, but an encapsulated component gets exchanged for another one.
Resource Container Actions reect changes around a virtual or physical server. Acquire
and Terminate Actions start and release a server/virtual machine. A Replicate Action
clones a server instance with its containing components.
We decided to model these actions into an EMF model and reference the PCMmeta-model.
This allows us to directly reference the aected resource container or assembly contexts
without any technology implications. Writing this code by hand would cause more eort
on a PCM meta-model update, however, the generated EMF models perform poorly during
debugging. Nevertheless, EMF meta-models are easily extendable and modiable and





For each action a set of pre-execution-conditions can be determined. Using this sets, a
universal order can be derived. However, we need two assumptions for this order to be
valid:
• Each component is aected by an action only once.
• The Change Repository Component Action does not aect a component.
• A server never gets acquired a terminated in one sequence.
The assumptions state, that neither assembly contexts, nor resource container are af-
fected by transitive actions. These assumptions are true, since the Adaptation Caluculation
(Section 9.1) is designed to calculate a direct transition into an entities nal (re-deployment)
state. As a result, the order inside a set of actions from the same type does not matter.
Further, the order within all Assembly Context Actions does not matter. The pre-execution-
condition per action are:
Action Pre-Execution-Condition
Allocate execute after Acquire
Deallocate execute before Terminate
Migrate execute after Acquire & before Terminate




Table 9.1: Pre-Execution-Conditions for adaptation actions
Note, that the change repository component condition is not a "hard" condition, since
the encapsulated component could be exchanged even after the migration is performed.
However, the action appended data reference the hosting resource container and assembly
context before the component is migrated. Without this condition, the action execution
would have to check, whether the component was migrated.
Based on the pre-execution-conditions of Table 9.1 the following order was calculated:
1 Acquire
2 Change Repository Component
3 Deallocate & Allocate & Migrate
4 Terminate & Replicate
Table 9.2: Universal action execution order
This order is a universal execution order for the actions calculated by the Adaptation
Calculation. When the actions are executed in this order no dependency conicts will




The adaptation executions task is to execute the adaptation sequence calculated by adap-
tation planning. Since the actions are technology independent, we require a technological
dependent script/function that represents the action. A scripts can be considered the im-
plementation of an action. These scripts are given to iObserve Privacy via input parameter.
The technological implications are not considered by this thesis and are therefore not
further discussed. However, the separation of technology independent and dependent part
of the execution is very futile to the whole iObserve principle.
We recommended to execute the scripts asynchronous. This enables iObserve privacy
to track the changes in real-time. This allows for post-adaptation evaluation. This means,
iObserve (privacy) can check, whether the runtime model is now semantically equivalent
to the re-deployment model. Further details on the execution of the adaptation actions can
be found in [21].
9.3 Implementation
The implementation is split into three parts: the action calculation, the action ordering
and the action execution. The calculation is based on the same graph as used during the
Privacy Analysis (Figure 7.6). The Assembly Context Actions get calculated independently
from the Resource Container Actions, the principle however is the same. See Algorithm 3
for the pseudo code.
Initially the algorithm adds all assembly components to a dictionary. In the main
procedure, the algorithm iterates over all re-deployment assembly components and tries
to nd a matching one in the runtime model. If no match as found, it is a new assembly
component and needs to be allocated. If an equivalent was found, dierent comparisons
are performed, to check whether adjustments have to be made. Keep in mind, that
the migration of a assembly component and the exchange of encapsulated repository
component do not exclude each other. At the end of every iteration, the found runtime
components get removed from the dictionary. At the end of the algorithm all remaining
runtime assembly components are no longer required and can be deallocated. We need to
point out, that the comparing operators are simplied for the purpose of a pseudo-code.
The calculation of the Resource Container Actions is implemented similar. Initially all
servers get added to a dictionary, all re-deployment servers get compared against those
and the actions calculated accordingly.
The whole calculation is build around the stability of IDs on Palladio model elements. If
the re-deployment model creates a completely new system model, while changing only
minor details, the calculation will deallocate the old system and allocate a totally new one.
PerOpteryx modies the system model, keeping the assembly context IDs - as intended -
stable and therefore produces only minimal actions.
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Algorithm 3 Action Calculation algorithm
1: Dictionary components
2: List of Action actions
3:
4: procedure Init(List<Components> runtimeComponents)
5: for all runComponent ← runtimeComponents do





11: procedure CalculateActions(List<Components> reDeplComponents)
12:
13: for all reDeplComp ← reDeplComponents do
14: runComp ← get(reDeplComp.AssemblyContextID)
15: if runComp == Null then
16: actions .add( new AllocateAction(. . . ) )
17: else
18: if runComp.ComponentID != reDeplComp.ComponentID then
19: actions .add( new ChanдeRepoAction(. . . ) )
20: end if
21: if runComp.ResContainerID != reDeplComp.ResContainerID then






28: for all runComp ← components do






This chapter is structured as follows: Initially the concept is elaborated (Section 10.1),
followed by evaluation scenarios (Section 10.2) and the evaluation models (Section 10.3).
The actual evaluation consists of the single tasks: monitoring (Section 10.4), privacy
analysis (Section 10.4), model generation (Section 10.5) and system adaptation (Section 10.7).
Finally we are analysing the threats of validity (Section 10.8). Note, all evaluation models,
test data and results can be found at [31].
10.1 Evaluation Design
iObserve Privacy is a complex approach with many depending tasks. Evaluating the
program as a whole is next to impossible due to the multiplexing dependencies. The
evaluation factors would not be manageable and inconclusive results would make the
evaluation itself pointless. So we decided to evaluate every task independently. The order
and structure was inspired by the iObserve pipeline.
The task evaluation is generally split into an Accuracy evaluation and a Scalability
evaluation. The accuracy evaluation aims for the correct functionality. This means, we
are testing whether the actual results are equal to expected results. For the evaluation we
are creating a set of Evaluation Scenarios, which reect real-world situations by dening a
starting point and an expected endpoint. If the systems result diers from the endpoint,
the reasons must be found and analysed.
The scalability evaluation aims for the systems runtime characteristic, based on an
increasing work load. The actual accuracy result of the task is of no interest during
the analysis. The primary measurement is the tasks execution time, dependent on the
assembly context count and resource container count. Both axis are logarithmic scaled, so
the execution behaviour is clearly visible. The individual models are randomly generated,
based on a repository model input.
We will use the Jaccard Coecient to evaluate model changes during the accuracy
evaluation. Prior to the execution a target model is created, representing the desired
post-execution state. The runtime model is compared to the target model, dierences are
calculated, as well as the jaccard coecient. The coecient is dened as the intersection
set of runtime and target model divided through the union set of these models:
JC(A,B) =
|A ∩ B |
|A ∪ B |
If the models are completely equal, the result is 1.0 [1]. We are comparing the system
model, the resource environment model and the allocation model. The repository and
the usage model model is not modied by iObserve Privacy and therefore do not need
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any comparison. All models elements are matched by element content. The system and
resource environment model are also compared by element ID. All models modied by
iObserve Privacy are order independent, so an order match, like the Spearman Coecient,
is not required.
The test device is a Surface Pro 4 using Windows 10 as Operating System. The important
hardware specications are a i7-6650U processor with 2.2 up to 3.4 GHz, 4 MB cache and 2
cores with hyper-threading. The system uses 16 GB of RAM and a 265 GB Solid State Drive.
For more details see [33]. The used Java version is 1.8.0_121 form Oracle.
10.2 Evaluation Scenarios
The scenarios are structured in PRE, EVENT, REACTION and POST. PRE describes the
distributed software system before the event takes place. The EVENT is a trigger for a
certain process or task chain, usually referenced as REACTION. POST denes the state of
the software system after the reaction.
The scenarios describe the behaviour of iObserve Privacy through out all tasks, while
each task gets evaluated individually. Nevertheless, details of a scenario may need clari-
cation during the evaluation of this task.
The following scenarios are derived from the runtime changes mentioned in [10]. This
runtime changes are possible modication to a distributed software system. However,
not all mentioned scenarios are of interest in the privacy analysis context, these will be
discussed in Subsection 10.2.5. Scenarios 1 and 2 represent the observed system runtime
changes, which trigger the iObserve privacy pipeline. These are designed to show the
successful execution of a pipeline run with dierent triggers. Scenario 3 and 4 cover
the operator-in-the-loop scenarios. The operator is required, when an error occurs that
iObserve privacy can not handle itself. These scenarios are design specic and therefore
not derived from the runtime changes described in [10].
10.2.1 Scenario 1: Default
This scenario describes the "default" setting. It is used to evaluate the geo-location transfor-
mation, the privacy analysis, a successful execution of the re-deployment generation and
the adaptation planning.
• PRE: All components of the software system are deployed on Amazons EC2 service
on the EU Frankfurt location. The system is privacy compliant.
• EVENT: Amazons EU Frankfurt data centre has a critical failure. As a result Amazon
starts migrating local virtual machines towards the US Ohio and EU Ireland locations.
• REACTION: iObserve Privacy monitors the migration and starts a privacy analy-
sis. The analysis shows a privacy violation and as a result an alternative, privacy
compliant re-deployment is generated. A system adaptation plan is calculated based
on the re-deployment and nally executed.
• POST: The software system is in a privacy compliant state.
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10.2.2 Scenario 2: System extension
This scenario describes the deployment runtime change. It is used to evaluate the de-
ployment transformation, the privacy analysis, a successful execution of the re-deployment
generation and the adaptation planning.
• PRE: All personal categorized components of the software system are deployed on
Amazons EC2 service on the EU Frankfurt location. All other components are hosted
by an Ukrainian provider. The system is privacy compliant.
• EVENT: The system operator adds another component categorized as deperson-
alised to the Ukrainian server.
• REACTION: iObserve Privacy monitors the migration and starts a privacy analysis.
The privacy analysis shows a privacy violation due to joining data streams. An
alternative, privacy compliant deployment is computed by PerOpteryx. A system
adaptation plan is successfully calculated by the adaptation planning. Finally the
adaptation sequence is executed.
• POST: The software system is in a privacy compliant state.
10.2.3 Scenario 3: Failing Adaptation
This scenario is used to evaluate the operator-in-the-loop during the execution of the
adaptation sequence. Due to at least one non-automated adaptation action the operator
needs to be informed.
• PRE: All components of the software system are hosted by multiple server instances
of a cloud reseller.
• EVENT: The reseller migrates some of his servers to another cloud provider.
• REACTION: iObserve Privacy monitors the migration and starts a privacy analysis.
The privacy analysis results in a privacy violation. An alternative privacy compliant
deployment is computed. The adaptation calculation and planning is successful. The
adaptation sequence contains actions that can not be executed automatically. The
operator is informed about the action that can not be executed by the adaptation
execution.
• POST: iObserve Privacy shows the operator the adaptation sequence with emphasis
on the manual tasks.
10.2.4 Scenario 4: Missing Alternative
This scenario is used to evaluate the operator-in-the-loop during the re-deployment genera-
tion. PerOpteryx did not provide a privacy compliant re-deployment model and therefore
the operator is notied.
• PRE: All components of the software system are hosted by multiple server instances
of a cloud resellers.
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• EVENT: The reseller starts migrating his servers to another cloud provider.
• REACTION: iObserve Privacy monitors the migration and starts a privacy anal-
ysis. The privacy analysis shows a privacy violation. The computation of an al-
ternative privacy compliant deployment fails. iObserver privacy detects that the
re-deployment model is missing or not privacy compliant. The operator is notied
about the situation.
• POST: iObserve Privacy noties the operator about the missing privacy compliant
re-deployment model.
10.2.5 Futile Scenario
There are a couple of scenarios which do not apply to iObserve Privacy, due to various
reasons [10]. We will elaborate those scenarios shortly.
Performance or workload characteristics are not tackled, since performance and privacy
analysis combined wouldn’t be manageable in the scope of this thesis.
The un-deployment or de-replication are two scenarios which reduce the complexity of
the privacy analysis. A privacy violation can not be triggered by eliminating a component
and/or a server from the system.
The replication of a server, with all its components, will trigger a deployment event.
This means, this scenario is already covered by Scenario 2.
10.3 Evaluation Models
In the previous sections we dened a couple of scenarios for the evaluation. In order to
execute these scenarios, we need PCM Privacy models (chapter 5). Scenario and model
need to get selected individually, depending on the task to evaluate.
10.3.1 CoCoME-Cloud
The CoCoME Cloud PCM model is a representation of the CoCoME system as a distributed
cloud variant. It is a representation of a supermarket IT infrastructure. It consists of six
individual deployed components: logic.webservice.cashdeskline.cashdeskservice, cloud.web,
traidingsystem.inventory, traidingsystem.cashdeskline, webservice.inventory and traidingsys-
tem.external.bank. The system design is oriented on real distributed software systems with
dozens of interfaces and multiple composite components. As a result, CoCoME-Cloud
is very complex and not suited for the evaluation of specic aspects like the component
categorization or the deployment analysis. However, it is as the only available model fully
specied and "PerOpteryx ready". See [12] for detailed information on CoCoME.
10.3.2 Medi System
The Medi System is an PCM model, specially developed for the evaluation of this thesis. It
is supposed to reect the web system of a medical insurance. The required and provided
interfaces are reduced to the minimal necessity, to limit side eects and to gain meaningful
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Figure 10.1: Initial component categorization
results. Figure 10.1 shows the medi system with all components and interface connections.
The deployment will depend on the evaluation scenario.
10.3.3 Generated Models
We developed a model generator and model modicator for the scalability analysis. The
generator requires an input repository and creates a valid PCM Privacy model with the
given amount of assembly contexts and resource containers. The contained component in
the assembly context is randomly selected, as well as the resource container it is allocated
on. All required interfaces are correctly connected, primarily to provided interfaces without
an existing connection.
The model is usually constructed with a distribution of 40% Resource Container and
60% Assembly Contexts. This means, a model with 1000 nodes consists of 400 servers and
connected 600 components. We argue, that this leads to a near real-world distribution
of servers with the majority of servers hosting one or two components, a few hosting
three or more components and some empty servers. The classication of the Assembly
Connectors is distributed among 15% Personal, 35% Depersonalised and 50% Anonymous.
This distribution is oriented on the CoCoME classication.
The combination of node and classication distribution leads to every possible execution
path during the execution, as tests have shown. This is the primary concern for the
scalability tests, since the tests aim for a near real-world setting.
The model modicator adapts the system randomly, based on action counts specied.
The modication supports server acquisition and termination and assembly context al-
location, deallocation and migration. Further, it supports the exchange of the contained
repository component for a component with the same interfaces. Note, the generated




The Transformation evaluation consists of an accuracy and a scalability evaluation. The
main purpose is to test the transformation of the sent information to the architectural
runtime model. Further, the iObserve privacy pipeline has to be triggered upon changes.
Scenario #1 (Subsection 10.2.1) and Scenario #2 (Subsection 10.2.2) describe the two possible
triggers: the Deployment Event, when a component is deployed on a server, and the
GeoLocation Event, when the geo-location of a server changes.
10.4.1 Transformation: Accuracy Evaluation
For the accuracy evaluation we are using the CoCoME-Cloud model (Subsection 10.3.1),
since it is completely specied and reects a real-world system the most appropriate way
available. We need to show, that the TDeployment, TUndeployment and TGeoLocation
Transformations apply the sent data correctly to the PCM model. Potential errors must be
handled and processed. For this purpose we will use two executions. First, we will execute
a logically valid input set of events, to show the correctness of the transformation. In a
second execution we will show, that logically wrong inputs are processed correctly. Both
runs start with an empty allocation model.
Table 10.1 shows the initial input event sequence. Initially all components are being
deployed, followed by a geo-location update for each server and a re-deployment of the
cloud.web component from Server1-EU to Server5-EU and nally a geo-location update on
Server4-EU to Ukraine.
Action Values
Deployment tradingsystem.external.Bank on Server6-EU
Deployment tradingsystem.cashdeskline on Server4-EU
Deployment cloud.web on Server1-EU
Deployment webservice.inventory on Server1-EU
Deployment tradingsystem.inventory on Server2-EU
Deployment logic.webservice.cashdeskline.cashdeskservice on Server3-EU
GeoLocation Server1-EU on 276 (GER)
GeoLocation Server2-EU on 276 (GER)
GeoLocation Server3-EU on 250 (FRA)
GeoLocation Server4-EU on 250 (FRA)
GeoLocation Server5-EU on 826 (GBR)
GeoLocation Server6-EU on 826 (GBR)
UnDeployment cloud.web from Server1-EU
Deployment cloud.web on Server5-EU
GeoLocation Server4-EU on 804 (UKR)
Table 10.1: The correct execution set
We expect a run without any errors, an allocation model, which represents the described
deployment and a design decisions model, with the according degree of freedoms.
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The results are true to our expectations. The system reports no errors and the models
represent the system exactly as intended. The Jaccard Coecient is 1.0.
Action Values
Table 10.1 commands
Deployment cloud.web on Server1-EU*
UnDeployment cloud.web from Server5-EU
UnDeployment cloud.web from Server5-EU*
Deployment cloud.web on Server7-EU*
Deployment IllegalComonent on Server1-EU*
UnDeployment IllegalComonent from Server1-EU*
UnDeployment tradingsystem.inventory from Server3-EU*
GeoLocation Server7-EU on 826 (GBR)*
Table 10.2: The error execution set
To test the error behaviour, we need to input logically false events. To gain a valid system
state, we are starting with the valid order (Table 10.1) and append illegal orders. Table 10.2
shows the exact execution sequence. Illegal events are marked with a *. We expect these
orders to give a warning and to be ignored. The system must continue running. The test
includes the following cases: Deployment of an already deployed component, deployment
or undeployed on a non-existing server, geo-location record from a non-existing server,
un-deployment of a non-existing deployment.
The error run ends up to be exactly as intended. All faulty commands got ignored and
the Jaccard Coecient is 1.0. Both Jaccard coecients show, that the (un-)deployment
and geo-location transformation works as anticipated. As a consequence we argue, that
the monitoring research question, RQ-M1, was successfully answered and that we have a
very good accuracy (see RQ-M2), since no case could be identied that did not work as
intended.
10.4.2 Transformation: Scalability Evaluation
For the scalability analysis we are using the Medi-System model with generated input.
The Medi-Model is chosen due to its less generic characteristic then the Gen-Model and
therefore more realistic result. Further, the Medi-Model as complex as the CoCoME model
in the eld to test, while easier to understand and less error prone during input generation.
The inputs are logically and syntactically valid. 30% of the inputs are deployments and
un-deployments, distributed relative to the current allocation status. The other 70% of
inputs are geo-location events, randomly distributed over all available servers. This ratio
is an over-approximation towards the more complex and computation intensive allocation
and de-allocation events. The expected real-world occurrence of a deployment events
to the geo-location event is about 1 to 10000. This way, we expect the deployment and
un-deployment event to have a more signicant impact on the runtime behaviour. Every
measurement was repeated ten times to eliminate potential measurement errors. The log
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outputs remain active, the snapshot creation is deactivated, so no further pipeline lters
















Figure 10.2: Transformation runtime & Standard Deviation
The results (Figure 10.2) show a linear runtime behaviour, for the maximum input size of
1 million events the execution takes about 820 seconds. The according standard deviation
of 22 makes it a stable and fast result, concerning RQ-M3.
10.5 Privacy Analysis
The Privacy Analysis was discussed in chapter 3 (Privacy Concept) and chapter 7 (Pri-
vacy Analysis). As described there, the privacy analysis consists of two sequential parts:
Component Classication and Deployment Analysis. According to this tasks, the accuracy
evaluation is also split. The accuracy evaluation uses the Medi-System model (Subsec-
tion 10.3.2), due to its moderate complexity level, where eects like the Joining Data Stream
occur, but the results are still traceable.
10.5.1 Privacy Analysis: Accuracy Evaluation
We will show, that the Component Classication categorizes components correctly. This
includes the correct initial categorization (C1), the nding of joining data streams (C2) and
single data stream (C3). Further, we will show, that the Deployment Analysis nds illegally
deployed personal components on un-save geo-locations (D1), joining data streams on the
deployment level (D2) and ignores joining data streams on a save geo-location (D3). As
a result, we demonstrate the correctness of our privacy analysis, as specied in the goal
section (Section 1.3).
The scenarios #1 (Subsection 10.2.1) and #2 (Subsection 10.2.1) aim to trigger a privacy
analysis and describe dierent privacy violations. We showed in Section 10.4, that both
trigger, the deployment event and the geo-location event are correctly processed and the
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information, are successfully transformed to the PCM model. Both pipeline triggers lead
to the same privacy analysis and are therefore equivalent for this accuracy evaluation.













Figure 10.3: Initial system state
The initial system state is as shown in Figure 10.3. The system is privacy compliant
and only the GovStatistics component is not allocated on a server. iObserve will trigger
the pipeline by processing a TGeoLocation transformation, which migrates the Server2
to Belarus. With this trigger, we will show, that the component categorization works as
intended.
We expect the initial component categorization to be equal to the most personal interface
level the component has (C1). After the Categorization Analysis the MarketingAnalysis
component should be classied as personal, due to its two personal communication partners
(C2). The privacy level categorization of the components ErrorDetection, TreatmentAnalysis
and CourseAnalysis must remain unchanged, since they share a single depersonalised
interface as data source (C3). The deployment must remain legal.















Figure 10.4: Initial categorization















Figure 10.5: Categorization analysis result
After the execution we calculated a Jaccard Coecient of 1.0. This shows us that
the pipeline trigger was correctly processed. Figure 10.4 shows the initial component
categorization, Figure 10.5 shows the categorization analysis result. This states show,
that our expectations on the component categorization, C1,C2 and C3, were met. The
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deployment analysis reports a legal deployment, which is also what we anticipated. So,
the results are true to our expectations.
To trigger the pipeline another time, we will deploy the GovStatistics component onto
Server2. The component must be tagged depersonalised and the deployment analysis must
report a joining data stream on Server2 (D2).

























Figure 10.6: Deployment analysis result (1)
Figure 10.6 visualises the component categorization and deployment analysis result.
The execution of the second pipeline trigger, reports a privacy violation. The cause is a
joining data stream on Server2. This is what we provoked and expected (D2). The Jaccard
Coecient for the trigger processing is 1.0, again.
For the nal pipeline trigger, we will migrate Server2 into the EU, to Italy. We expect,
that the server no longer reports a illegal deployment, despite the potential joining data
stream on the server (D3). During the migration, Great Britain is removed from the save
country list, due to a management decision. As a consequence, we predict a new privacy
violation concerning the deployment of the personal MarketingAnalysis component on
Server4 (D1).
Figure 10.7 shows the nal trigger result. As expected, the Marketing Analysis deploy-
ment on Server4 is reported as privacy violation. Further, Server2 is now privacy compliant.
The Jaccard Coecient is 1.0, so the geo-location transformation was successfully executed.
The result is true to our expectations, this means, we have successfully shown D1 and D3.
We have shown, that the Component Classication algorithm and the Deployment Anal-
ysis works as intended. Further, we proofed the concept of a privacy analysis on an
architectural level as intended in Section 1.3 (RQ-A1). We exemplary showed the correct-
ness of the component categorization and the deployment analysis. This includes the two
major tasks of detecting joining data streams on component categorization and deployment
analysis level. Further, we showed the correct identication of a set of components, located
on a server, sharing a single depersonalised component as a data source. So, concerning
RQ-A2, we have a perfect accuracy. Further, exemplary privacy violations will be used in
the other accuracy evaluations.
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Figure 10.7: Deployment analysis result (2)
10.5.2 Privacy Analysis: Scalability Evaluation
For the scalability evaluation of the privacy analysis, we will use the generated model
(Subsection 10.3.3), since models of the intended scale are not constructable by hand.
The time measurement starts before the graph is constructed from the model. Time
measures are taken for the component classication and the deployment analysis. Complex
console outputs, like the system structure, are deactivated to minimise random performance
inuences.
We measure a graph size of 10 to one million nodes on a logarithmic scale. The model set-
up was described in Subsection 10.3.3. The legal geo-locations consist of 40 random chosen
countries, while the server geo-locations are distributed among roughly 200 countries.
This proportion was chosen to provoke many privacy violations and a signicant amount
of joining data stream analysis. Each model measurement is repeated ten times to minimize
runtime eects.
Figure 10.8 shows the accumulated runtime in the order the tasks are executed. Initially,
the graph for the privacy analysis is created, followed by the component classication and
nally the deployment analysis. The graph shows a nearly linear increasing runtime. The
major time is consumed by the graph construction, while the component classication
and deployment analysis only show minor size eects. The accumulated runtime for
one million nodes is still signicantly below ten seconds. The limiting task for further
scalability tests is the graph generation due to memory limitations and java HashMap
overow errors. However, graphs with the size of 1000 and more nodes are already very
unlikely.
The standard deviation Figure 10.9 is increasing - in general - linear with the model
size. The deployment analysis however, shows some irregular behaviour. This could be
due to the randomly selected save countries. A standard deviation of three times the
actual mean runtime shows signicantly runtime computation dierences. Nevertheless,
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Figure 10.8: Privacy Analysis runtime
considered very fast. And an overall privacy analysis runtime of maximum 15 seconds
is also very quick. So, concerning the research question RQ-A3, we can argue, that the
privacy analysis has good scaling characteristics and a very fast execution time.
10.6 Model Generation
The privacy compliant model generation is only evaluated under the Accuracy aspect. The
Scalability evaluation was already performed by the creators of PerOpteryx (see [16]) and
our Privacy Analysis was evaluated in Section 10.5. We will focus on the problem specied
in Section 1.2, the generation of a privacy compliant re-deployment model.
For this evaluation we use the CoCoME model (Subsection 10.3.1) together with the
scenarios #2 (Subsection 10.2.2) and #4 (Subsection 10.2.4). Scenario #2 describes a complete
iObserve Privacy execution, including the successful execution of PerOpteryx for the re-
deployment model generation. Scenario #4 describes the case, in which PerOpteryx fails
to generate a privacy compliant candidate. We will start with Scenario #2.
We deploy the CoCoME components on one EU server each and adjust the individ-
ual server costs to reect EU and Non-EU status (see chapter 8). We will trigger the
pipeline by moving the Server4-EU, which hosts the component, categorised as personal,
webservice.inventory, to Ukraine.
After the execution of our model generation framework, PerOpteryx, we expect the
re-deployment model to be privacy compliant. This is the major concern and primary
focus. However, we further anticipate a deployment with fewer server in use, as well as a
migration of multiple depersonalised components to Non-EU servers.
PerOpteryx is congured to execute four iterations with 20 candidates per iteration. This
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Figure 10.9: Privacy Analysis runtime standard deviation
Component Categorization Deployment Redeployment
cloud.web Depersonalized Server1-EU Server6-EU
tradingsystem.inventory Personal Server2-EU Server1-EU
cashdeskline.cashdeskservice Depersonalized Server3-EU Server2-NonEU
webservice.inventory Personal Server4-EU Server6-EU
tradingsystem.cashdeskline Depersonalized Server5-EU Server4-EU
tradingsystem.external.Bank Depersonalized Server6-EU Server3-NonEU
Table 10.3: Component categorization, runtime deployment and re-deployment
The Table 10.3 shows the components, their data privacy level classication, the initial
deployment and the generated re-deployment. A performed privacy analysis on the re-
deployment model shows, that the model is privacy compliant. So, the major goal (see
Section 1.3) was accomplished. Further, depersonalised components were moved to more
cheap Non-EU severs and two components were deployed onto the same server. Both
deployment goals indicate, that the most cost ecient model was chosen - as intended.
However, no component stays at this original server, which produces (unnecessary) mi-
gration costs. The execution time of PerOpteryx was about 30 seconds and elven of 80
candidates were privacy compliant.
In scenario #4, no privacy compliant re-deployment model can be found, PerOpteryx
crashes or any kind of error occurs. However, the end result stays unchanged, no valid
re-deployment model is available after the PerOpteryx execution. We are provoking this
situation by deploying all components onto a single server. As the pipeline trigger we are
moving this server to a Non-EU geo-location. We expect iObserve Privacy to report, that
no privacy compliant PCM model was found. Basically, we expect, that iObserve invokes
the operator-in-the-loop for manual error treatment.
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The execution shows an error, which states, that the given re-deployment model is not
privacy compliant. If a listener would be registered, the listener would have been notied.
The execution lives up to our expectations.
Concerning the research questions in Section 1.3, we have shown that we are able to
generate a privacy compliant re-deployment model (RQ-P1) and that we are able to invoke
the operator-in-the-loop on an error situation (RQ-P2).
10.7 System Adaptation
The Adaptation Planing, described in chapter 9, aims for calculating a sequence of adap-
tation actions. The execution of this adaptation order must result in a runtime model,
that is equivalent to the redeployment model. This is one of the research goals stated in
Section 1.3. We will evaluate this task towards its accuracy and scalability.
10.7.1 Adaptation: Accuracy Evaluation
We will continue with scenario #2 from the generation evaluation (Section 10.6). This
means, we use the input model from model generation, as well as the calculated re-
deployment model to calculate the adaptation sequence. We will show the correctness of
the adaptation sequence calculation, by translating the adaptation order to an equivalent
iObserve privacy input event sequence. After iObserve privacy processed the events, the
Jaccard Coecient - between the computed re-deployment model from PerOpteryx and the
iObserve runtime model - must be 1.0. As mentioned, this example shows the continues
MAPE loop and is therefore as close as possible to a real world example.
We expect the calculated adaptation sequence to represent a series of adaptation actions
that migrates the runtime model towards the re-deployment model. Further, we anticipate
the order to be sorted after the Unversal Action Order specied in Table 9.2. This means,
the sequence is initially acquiring the newly used servers, followed by a series of migration
actions, that move the components to their new servers. Finally there should be three
terminate actions to release the servers, that are no longer needed.
Table 10.4 shows the output adaptation sequence for scenario #2. The result is true to
our expectations. The Unversal Action Order is met. For the transformation onto iObserve
input events, we can ignore the acquire actions, since the resource containers already exist
in the resource environment model. Every migrate action needs to be translated into two
events: a Undeployment event and a Deployment event. The terminate actions can also be
ignored, since there is no real server to release or terminate. We expect the system to be
in a privacy compliant state after the execution of the iObserve input events. Table 10.5
shows the resulting iObserve input events.
The execution of the transformed adaptation sequence (Table 10.5) results in a privacy
compliant PCM model and the Jaccard Coecient of the post-execution runtime model
and the calculated redeployment model is 1.0. So, the result fullls our expectations and







Migrate webservice.inventory Server4-EU -> Server6-EU
Migrate tradingsystem.cashdeskline Server5-EU -> Server4-EU
Migrate tradingsystem.external.Bank Server6-EU -> Server3-NonEU
Migrate cashdeskline.cashdeskservice Server3-EU -> Server2-NonEU
Migrate cloud.web Server1-EU -> Server6-EU




Table 10.4: The ordered adaptation sequence
Action Values
UnDeployment webservice.inventory from Server4-EU
Deployment webservice.inventory on Server6-EU
UnDeployment tradingsystem.cashdeskline from Server5-EU
Deployment tradingsystem.cashdeskline on Server4-EU
UnDeployment tradingsystem.external.Bank from Server6-EU
Deployment tradingsystem.external.Bank on Server3-NonEU
UnDeployment cashdeskline.cashdeskservice from Server3-EU
Deployment cashdeskline.cashdeskservice on Server2-NonEU
UnDeployment cloud.web from Server1-EU
Deployment cloud.web on Server3-EU
UnDeployment tradingsystem.inventory from Server2-EU
Deployment tradingsystem.inventory on Server1-EU
Table 10.5: iObserve input event translated adaptation sequence
We will continue to evaluate the System Adaptation with scenario #3 to show the
limitations and so far unseen capabilities of the adaptation calculation. PerOpteryx only
adapts the system given according to the Design Decision model (see chapter 8). For
iObserve Privacy PerOpteryx will only produce acquire, migrate and terminate actions.
These are (usually) automatically executable.
For this scenario the Medi-Sys is used. We will modify the Medi-Sys model to provoke
one of each action. Figure 10.10 shows the runtime model, Figure 10.11 shows the re-
deployment model. The anticipated dierence between these models is shown in Table 10.6.
We expect each of the seven actions to be detected, except the replicate action, since this is
not (yet) supported by the adaptation calculation. It will be subsided by an aquire Server2-2
and an allocate GovStatistics on Server2-2.
The execution of the adaptation calculation shows the expected result (see Table 10.7).
The replicate action is split into the expected acquire and allocate actions (marked with an
*). To summarize, the results are true to our expectations.
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Figure 10.10: Runtime model


























Figure 10.11: Redeployment model
Scenario #4 intends to invoke the operator-in-the-loop. We are unable to evaluate this
scenario, since no technology dependent scripts (see Section 9.2) for the actual execution
are available to decide whether an action is automatically executable. This depends strongly
on the used system binary management tools.
Concerning the research questions stated in Section 1.3, we have proved the concept of
calculating an automated system adaptation sequence (RQ-E1). However, not all dened
corner cases could be detected correctly. Nevertheless, the default real-world CoCoME
example was successfully calculated and proven to be correct. Overall, RQ-E2 shows a
moderate to good accuracy.
10.7.2 Adaptation: Scalability Evaluation
For the scalability analysis we are using generated, logically valid PCM Privacy models
(Subsection 10.3.3). These models are randomly modied with respect to the logically
validity. This means, that the model does not contain any errors like unconnected required
interfaces, not allocated assembly contexts and deployments on non-existing resource





Exchange Component CourseAnalysis to CourseAnalysis-2
Deallocate MarketingAnalysis from Server-4
Allocate AccountingService-2 on Server-6
Migrate ErrorDetection from Server-3 to Server-6
Replicate Server-2 (with GovStatistics)
Terminate Server-4




Exchange Component CourseAnalysis to CourseAnalysis-2
Allocate AccountingService-2 on Server-6 (*)
Allocate GovStatistics-2 on Server2-2
Deallocate MarketingAnalysis from Server-4
Migrate ErrorDetection from Server-3 to Server-6
Terminate Server-4
Table 10.7: Expected adaptation sequence for Scenario #4
model graphs, as well as the time for the execution of the Adaptation Calculation and the
Adaptation Planning.
The initial model is constructed as described in Subsection 10.3.3. The modication is
linear distributed over the acquire, terminate, allocate, deallocate, migrate and exchange
component modications. However, not every modication in the model leads to an
adaptation action. The adding of another resource container is only recognized as an
acquire action, if an assembly context is allocated on that new resource container. The
termination of a resource container, that hosts one or more components, leads also to a
migration action. With this in mind, we measure the time of the adaptation calculation and
adaptation planning based on the amount of modications in the model. The model itself
is three times as big as the modications provoked, so the anticipated amount of changes
are possible. A model with 100 nodes can not contain 1000 modications. We decided
against a static model size due to long evaluation runs. Each measurement is repeated
ten times, to reduce the impact of runtime eects. The input sizes are 10, 100, 1000 and
10000. An evaluation run with 100000 provoked changes was aborted after twelve hours
of computation.
Figure 10.12 shows the runtime results. The graph creation shows a linear runtime
behaviour, like in Subsection 10.5.2 already noticed. The adaptation calculation consumes
an increasingly amount of time. This can be explained with the increasing model size, since
the actual action calculation is optimized for O(1) operations, while the action creation
operates with PCM model elements directly. The EMF framework in general shows poor
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Figure 10.12: Adaptation runtime
[8][27]. The adaptation planning needs next to no time, shown by the time line on top of
the adaptation calculation line.
The standard deviation (Figure 10.13) shows mostly constant deviations. However, the
adaptation calculation increases signicantly on the last evaluation run. We assume this
is due to JVM memory management and EMF eects. However, a standard deviation of
roughly 3 seconds to a runtime of 30 seconds is within an acceptable ratio, considering
that two models and graphs of 30000 nodes have to be managed.
The Adaptation Planning scalability evaluation shows satisfying results. Concerning
the research question RQ-E3 it is considered very fast with an acceptable variance.
10.8 Threats to validity
Like in any scientic publications, the evaluation has threats to its validity. We will scope
the most important points and highlight the crucial aspects.
10.8.1 Internal Validity
Our decision to evaluate every major iObserve Privacy task independently is a key stone
to the internal validity. It allowed us to provoke every possible reaction and eect without
potential side eects. As a result, we could perfectly track cause and result of certain
eects.
Scalability tests often require an even more isolated and specialised testing. In our
case the individual task had to be called from outside their ordinary call scheme, the
TeeTime framework. This was necessary so enable tests of the performed size. This blurs
the results in the context of the whole system, however, sharpens the individual tasks
runtime behaviour.
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Figure 10.13: Adaptation runtime SD
10.8.2 External Validity
One threat towards external validity are the missing live tests. Since testing on a real
software system takes way longer, technology specic side eects, dependencies and errors
have to be handled, we created inputs by hand. The input is logically and syntactically
valid, however, potential corner cases could have been missed, despite extensive testing.
Nevertheless, all tests aiming for a real-world authenticity were using the CoCoME PCM
model. This model was designed to provide a scientic comparable, near real-world
standard. So, iObserve Privacy was evaluated as close to a real-world application as
possible, while using realistic inputs.
10.8.3 Construction Validity
While the individual task evaluation was the internal validities strength, it is a weakness
of the construction validity. However, during the accuracy evaluations, the whole pipeline
was (usually) invoked, evaluation scenarios were continued and an internal logically
validity was established. So, the evaluation is well interleaved and the likelihood of
construction errors should be, despite the individual task evaluation, minimized.
Nevertheless, the target evaluation models are constructed by hand, which tends to
be error prone. However, to produce the same error in the evaluation target model like
iObserve Privacy does is very unlikely.
10.8.4 Conclusion Validity
The accuracy evaluation is considered very conclusive with sucient tests, scenarios and
models. Most of the scalability evaluations are also quite conclusive. However, the bad
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EMF performance limits the test sizes. This is especially true for the adaptation planning
scalability evaluation, with the maximum input of 10000 changes. This makes the result
not as meaning as possible, but still viable.
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In this chapter we are presenting a couple of related publications, this work can be
referenced to. The sections are oriented on the task and problems mentioned in Section 1.3.
11.1 Application Monitoring
The monitoring of software systems is common task in many research elds. Automated
data-ow analysis, software proling and hardware utilization are only a small selection
of groups, using this term. In the following, we use application monitoring in the sense of
online extraction of runtime data form a (distributed cloud) application for architecture
optimization.
R-PRIS (Section 11.2) and Kieker are application monitoring frameworks. While iObserve
uses Kieker to extract the desired information, R-PRIS is independent from other programs.
Neither of them uses a meaningful architecture description language (ADL) to process and
store the gathered information. iObserve however gathers the transmitted data, processes
them and stores them into a PCM model, enabling all kind of PCM-based applications to
use the gathered information [22][23][11].
11.2 Privacy Analysis
R-PRIS is a monitoring and analysing tool for distributed cloud systems. Like iObserve,
R-PRIS updates a runtime model by monitoring the cloud systems. During the analysis
phase the model is checked for (potential) privacy violations.
Like Kieker, R-PRIS combines push-based heartbeat monitoring with event processing,
and graph grammars for eciently updating those models [23]. R-PRIS uses a formal
specication for geo-location policies. These consists of data classication S , data content
types T and geo-locations L. Every specied policy p = (S,T ,L) is forbidden. This means,
a data modelling is required with a Classication and the containing ContentType (see Fig-
ure 11.1). During privacy analysis R-PRIS checks whether a privacy protected information
can be accessed from an non-privacy compliant location. This can be transformed into
an st-connectivity problem, a standard problem in graph theory and analysis. Based on
the runtime model (Figure 11.2) - with its meta-model (Figure 11.1) - R-PRIS performs a
reachability check [24].
In terms of software, R-PRIS searches for communication paths in the distributed system,
which can potentially transmit personal data to a non-privacy compliant geo-location.
In order to detect these communication paths a policy p must be specied, representing
exactly this case, which however doesn’t necessarily communicate private data. As a
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Figure 11.1: R-PRIS meta-model Figure 11.2: R-PRIS runtime model
result, a lot of policies have to be specied, which prohibit many potentially harmless
communication paths.
Based on their runtime model, Schmieders et al. identied four relevant migration-cases
and extracted six required informations to detect a policy violation[24]:
# Required information to carry out runtime check
R1 Interactions of two components
R2 Access of components to locally stored les
R3 Meta-information of stored or processed data
R4 Information on component deployments on physical resources
R5 Geo-location information of physical resources
R6 Explicit or implicit information on transitive data transfers
Table 11.1: R-PRIS information for runtime privacy checks [24]
Due to the comparable core task of detecting privacy violations, we are comparing
the R-PRIS privacy analysis against the iObserve Privacy privacy analysis. More detailed
information on R-PRIS can be found in [23][24].
Runtime Model R-PRIS uses the specially developed model shown in Figure 11.1. Even
while it models components, VMs and process, it does not capture the systems
architecture as the Palladio Component Model does. Further, it is not known, whether
tool support or other compatible programs exist, like the PCM has.
Categorization We are utilizing a component communication classication, which leads
to a component classication and a deployment analysis. Therefore, we do not
know what data are actually processed in a component or on a server. R-PRIS,
however, tags the data itself, traces the transitive access and prohibits rule violating
access. As a result, R-PRIS, uses the more accurate data tracking, which requires
more information and a more detailed knowledge about the observed system then
iObserve privacy. While iObserve privacy uses data categorization by hand, the
R-PRIS approach does not explain their modelling and categorization process.
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Rule Compliance iObserve Privacy is clearly build to stay EU General Data Protection
Regulation and HIPAA compliant. Therefore, a simple le input with save geo-
locations is sucient. R-PRIS requires a rule input, which species prohibited
data access. Compared to iObserve privacy, this is a more powerful and exible
input. Nevertheless, it complicates the usage and scales poorly with the system size,
deployment locations and data variety, since every prohibited access needs to be
specied for every data type per geo-location and content type.
11.3 Data-flow Analysis & Rights Management
(Access) Rights Management, like the Bell-LaPadula Model or Role-based access control,
are fundamentals in our modern information society. These systems restrict or allow
access on certain entities with the intention of information protection. The fundamen-
tals are well researched, so research currently is focused on resource and time ecient
rights management in large scale systems like companies, as well as automated rights
management on small, mobile devices [7].
Data-ow Analysis is a hot research topic due to the omnipresence of cloud services
and mobile devices with rich data sources. Applications like JOANA [25], TaintDroid [9],
Privacy Oracle [15] or automated privacy instrumentation [29] are only some of many
applications and approaches around data-tracking, data-ow analysis and leak detection.
However, nearly all of these approaches are using actual code or information rich models.
For our purposes we need automated data-ow analysis on architecture level, to deter-
mine if a system violates privacy regulations. This research is still in its early stages and
therefore not suited for applications with our designated level of complexity.
11.4 Privacy Analysis
Most research in this eld focuses on prevention of policy violation. “However, changes
of data geo-locations imposed by migration or replication of the component storing the
data are not considered. Data transfers between the client services and further services
are not covered. Transitive data transfers that may lead to policy violations thus remain
undetected.”[24]
As mentioned in Section 11.2, R-PRIS is searching for potential access violations in the
application model, by using a st-connectivity analysis.[24][23] This approach is overesti-
mating the privacy aspects by not including which kind of data are actually communicated
between components and geo-locations. This makes it impractical for many business
applications, due to the high likelihood of allowing only deployments on save-considered
geo-locations.
11.5 Automated Model Optimization &Modification
The research eld of model analysis based performance optimizer can be roughly divided
into two sections. First, the rule-based approaches, which apply a predened rule, based
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on the detected problem, onto the system model. Second, metaheuristic-based approaches,
which use a generic framework and evolutionary algorithms for multiple arbitrary quality
criteria.[18]
PerOpteryx (Section 2.5) is a metaheuristic-based approach. However, PerOpteryx does
not consider a hosts geo-location during its optimization process. This can be changed by
adding an allocation constraint, preventing privacy violating deployments.
11.6 Automated Cloud Migration & Adaptation
Since the start of cloud computing there has been plenty of research on how to migrate
regular on premise applications and software into the cloud. Either software is cloud-
enabled in the most automatic fashion possible or the software is cloud-native, meaning
specially developed or redesigned, by developers, for running inside the cloud. While
there has been good progress semi-automatically cloud-enabled software, the eld of
migrating cloud applications form one cloud provider to another is just beginning. One of
the main issues is resulting in provider individual Cloud-APIs. Current, state of the art
is the "Docker" or container-technology, which wraps the application like a VM and is
suitable for many cloud provider. Nevertheless, many cloud provider oer special purpose
solutions, where a docker solution is not viable. The technology side of cloud to cloud
migration will be left out in this thesis. [13][3]
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In this chapter we will wrap up this thesis with the limitations and the future work sections.
12.1 Limitations & Assumptions
Like every other scientic work, we can not build a universal, world ready system. We
need to accept and sometimes even require limitations to produce meaningful results for
certain aspects.
Cloud Provider objectives A cloud provider, like any other person or company, has his
own objectives. In the most cases prot maximization can be assumed as the primary
goal. This can be interpreted in multiple ways, from law in-compliant behaviour over
SLA violations to premium prices for extended services. Nevertheless, in general
the assumption stands, that Cloud Providers want to stay SLA and law compliant to
avoid lawsuits and reputation loss. Based on this, we assume our providers are law
and SLA compliant.
Separation of virtual servers For simplicity reasons, we need to assume that we can deploy
multiple Type 1 Data, depersonalised data, (Section 3.1) onto one data-centre, but on
dierent (virtual) server, without considering joining data stream (Subsection 7.1.3)
implications. Basically we assume, every virtual server has its own independent disk
and memory storage. If this assumption wouldn’t be made, massive per-instance
encryption or per data-centre deployment would be the valid solution. However,
encryption as a cloud-ready middle wear is a hot research topic around the globe
and not considered by this thesis.
Geo-location API To make a statement about the systems current privacy compliance, we
need the Resource Containers geo-location. If we don’t want to make extensive
geo-location determination process, like the ping round trip measurement, we need
the cloud provider to provide the geo-location via his cloud API.
ClosedWorld Assumption As mentioned in Section 3.3 we need the close world assumption
to make any statement about the privacy compliance. The implications of privacy
and data protective laws are too complex to make a automated, detailed and well
balanced statement on privacy compliance without the CWA.
Privacy Analysis Overestimation For the privacy analysis we forbid joining data streams
(Subsection 7.1.3). We are aware, that this is a considerably overestimation, especially
during the deployment analysis. We are doing so to ensure privacy compliance
without taking any chances and prevent deep component inspection and extensive
data protective law discussions.
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(In-)Correct Component Based Architecture Modern software systems and distributed cloud
applications in particular, are designed after the separation of concern principle. Sys-
tems designed after this principle encapsulate cohesive functionality in a component.
If a system ignores this basic design principle, it is possible that our approach does
not detect a privacy violation. Since a component gets its data privacy level from
the Assembly Connector, a component that saves personal data, but does not commu-
nicate them via an Assembly Connector can receive a incorrect data privacy level.
An example is a component, that receives personal information via an user interface
(e.g. Graphical User Interface) and saves or processes them itself. We argue that
such a monolithic system stands contrary to the fundamental idea of distributed
cloud systems. As a result, we ignored this case during this thesis.
12.2 Future Work
During the work on iObserve Privacy a couple of future oriented tasks and development
directions came visible to improve iObserve. In the following we are introducing a couple
of them.
Thesis merge B. Sc. Tobias Pöppke developed in his master thesis, Design Space Exploration
for Adaptation Planning in Cloud-based Applications [21], another iObserve modi-
cation. His modication aims for the automated support of modern cloud system.
The development of our iObserve systems happened under close cooperation and is
therefore well aligned for merging.
PerOpteryx integration PerOpteryx provides one of the core features of iObserve Privacy,
as a model generation framework. However, its huge dependencies, immense com-
plexity and plug-in architecture makes it nearly impossible to directly migrate it
into iObserve Privacy. Even small modications take major eort. The changed
mechanic must be well understood to prevent the system from breaking while mod-
ifying. A well thought and designed re-engineering is required to keep the core
functionality while reducing dependencies and complexity to a minimum. Such
a radical re-development eort should not be taken lightly, however would make
future extensions way easier.
Live tests Due to a missing distributed test system, iObserve Privacy could not be tested
in a real situation. Even though many test were run during the evaluation (see chap-
ter 10) and proven Kiker concepts were used, a live test provides further reassurance
and validity to the system as a whole.
Re-deploymentmodel choice PerOpteryx chooses the most cost ecient model in the set
of privacy compliant models as the re-deployment model. This selection can be
improved by adding more factors to the decision process. Potential factors could




(Semi-)automated Assembly Connector Privacy categorization We are using a manual ap-
proach for the Assembly Connectory Privacy data privacy level categorization. Fur-
ther, we don’t have any tool support, except the EMF editors. A heuristic-based
or neuronal network-based approach could support during the connector catego-
rization or even categorize the connector automatically. The potential angles of
approach are as wide as the imagination goes: from signature analysis to structure
analysis.
Datamodelling The Palladio Component Model does not support data modelling. However,
Schmieders et al. based his complete privacy analysis around a data model with
geo-location access [24][23]. By modelling the system data a more accurate approach
could be created. However, the current extension to the base PCM meta-model are
as minimal as possible. The modelling of the data used by the system would change
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